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Abstract—The advent of Generative Adversarial Network
(GAN) architectures has given anyone the ability of generating
incredibly realistic synthetic imagery. The malicious diffusion of
GAN-generated images may lead to serious social and political
consequences (e.g., fake news spreading, opinion formation, etc.).
It is therefore important to regulate the widespread distribution
of synthetic imagery by developing solutions able to detect them.
In this paper, we study the possibility of using Benford’s law to
discriminate GAN-generated images from natural photographs.
Benford’s law describes the distribution of the most significant
digit for quantized Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) coefficients.
Extending and generalizing this property, we show that it is
possible to extract a compact feature vector from an image. This
feature vector can be fed to an extremely simple classifier for
GAN-generated image detection purpose.
Index Terms—image forensics, GAN, Benford’s law
I. INTRODUCTION
With the advent of modern deep learning solutions such
as GANs, a new series of image and video editing tools
has been made available to everyone (e.g., Recycle-GAN [1],
StyleGAN [2], etc.). These techniques allow to synthesize
realistic and visually-pleasant artificial images not resorting
to complex Computer-Generated Imagery (CGI) techniques
required in the past. Unfortunately, this great step forward in
technology came at a price. Indeed, GANs can be maliciously
used by everyone to generate very realistic image forgeries
to manipulate people’s opinion through fake news spreading
[3]. To counter this threat, the forensic research community
has started to develop a series of techniques that detect fake
GAN-generated image [4]–[6].
All of the above-mentioned strategies are among the lat-
est solutions for GAN image detection. However, the CGI
detection problem has been extensively investigated in the
past multimedia forensic literature [7]–[9]. It is worth not-
ing that previous methods aimed at exposing some specific
CGI inconsistencies and artifacts from some characteristic
statistical traces or according to a pre-defined model. These
strategies were suggested by the knowledge of the available
CGI algorithms that could have been applied to generate
the fake image. However, GAN-generated images can not be
related to a well defined model, since each scheme presents its
own peculiarities depending on the implemented architecture
and training process. Indeed, as shown in [5], each architecture
may introduce different traces, thus making their generaliza-
tion a complex task. A detector that has been trained to detect
images generated by a specific GAN architecture could not be
suitable for a different GAN scheme.
For this reason, the approach analyzed in this paper focuses
on identifying and analyzing statistical traces that make GAN-
generated images differ from natural photographs. Previous
work has shown that, on natural digital images, the probability
distribution of specific variables usually follows a pre-defined
behavior that proves to be completely-altered whenever the
image is modified. As an example, the distribution of the
first significant digit of quantized DCT coefficients follow
Benford’s law [10]. This property can be proved whenever the
statistics of quantized DCT coefficients shows an exponential
decay and can be empirically-verified on real images.
Exploiting this property, many forensics detectors have been
successfully proposed in the literature (e.g., for detection
of JPEG compression [11], [12], face morphing [13], [14]
synthetic imagery, etc.). Despite these premises, there is no
current proof that GAN-generated pictures should be statisti-
cally compliant to Benford’s law [15].
In this work, we investigates whether Benford’s law can be
used for the detection of GAN-generated images. The reported
analysis is exploited to design a GAN image detector which
proved to be extremely accurate with a limited computational
effort. More precisely, we verify that Benford’s law is not
followed by GAN images, and we propose a set of related
features that could highlight this unfitting for an analyzed
digital image. A simple supervised learning framework is then
proposed to detect if an image is natural or GAN-generated
from the extracted features.
This solution is evaluated on an image corpus made avail-
able by the authors of [16], enriched by additional images
obtained by more modern GANs. We make use of more than
200 000 GAN-generated images obtained through different
architectures trained on different tasks on different datasets.
Results show that there is a trade-off between the chosen size
of the proposed feature vector and the achieved accuracy. It
is possible to either use a compact feature vector to obtain
results comparable with the state-of-the-art, or a larger feature
vector that allows improving against the more recent solutions
proposed in the literature. This flexibility makes the proposed
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solution particularly suitable also for low-power devices not
equipped with an advanced Graphics Processing Unit (GPU),
which might still need to detect whether images are fake or
not (e.g., smartphones, tablets, etc.). Additionally, we discuss
resilience to JPEG compression in order to better define the
working conditions of the proposed method.
II. BACKGROUND
Benford’s law, which is also known as First Digit (First
Digit (FD)) law or Significant Digit law, concerns the statisti-
cal frequencies of the most significant digits for the elements
of a real-life numerical set. More precisely, the rule states that,
given a set of measurements for some natural quantities (e.g.,
population of cities, stock prices, etc.), the statistics of their
FD follows the distribution depicted in Fig. 1 and described
by the equation
p(d) = log10
(
1 +
1
d
)
, (1)
where d is the FD in base 10 (the generalized version of
this law is presented in the next section). This has been
empirically-observed over a vast range of natural quanti-
ties [17], but it is also possible to prove it in closed form for
many exponentially-decreasing probability distributions [18].
It has also been observed that this rule is not well-fitted by
FD statistics from altered data: whenever numbers are changed
according to some selective strategies, FD frequencies deviate
from their theoretical values [19]. As a consequence, this proof
has been used as supporting evidence for detecting falsified
accounts, fake financial reports, and frauds [20].
This property has been largely exploited in multimedia
forensics to detect image tampering. In fact, natural image
DCT coefficients can be typically modeled by a Laplacian-
like distribution [21], which naturally follow Benford’s law,
and for this reason, the mentioned rule can be successfully
used in image forensic applications [22].
A well-known application of Benford’s law in forensics
is the study of JPEG compression traces [23]: the authors
propose using such rule to verify if an image has been JPEG
compressed once or twice. Milani et al. [12] exploit FD’s
features to detect multiple JPEG compression, also showing
robustness against rotation and scaling. Pasquini et al. [11]
address the multiple JPEG compression detection problem by
means of Benford-Fourier analysis. The same authors also
investigate traces of previous hidden JPEG compression in
uncompressed images [24].
This rule has also been successfully applied to other forensic
problems. In [25], the authors show that it is possible to
leverage FD distribution to roughly estimate the amount of
processing that has been applied to a given image. The
authors of [26] apply Benford’s law to solve image contrast
enhancement detection problem. In [27], the authors make use
of this law to deal with splicing forgery localization.
Another interesting application of Benford’s law in image
forensics is detecting computer graphics and computer gen-
erated images. To this purpose, Del Acebo et al. [14] model
light intensity in natural and synthetic images, concluding that
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p(
d
)
Fig. 1. Benford’s law FD pmf considering base 10 for FD computation.
FD’s law is not followed by the latter. Makrushin et al. [13]
show how to efficiently detect morphed faces using the fitting
parameters of the Benford’s logarithmic curve as a features.
Anyway, detecting synthetic images is nowadays a timely
and crucial forensic need due to the achievements of GAN
technology in generating highly-realistic fake photographs.
This possibility has been recently used to create false image
and video contents in deepfake political propaganda, revenge
porn, fake news creation. For these reasons, during the last
years multimedia forensics researchers have been focusing on
designing reliable strategies to detect synthetic images.
To this purpose, [4] proposes a method to detect image-
to-image translation over social networks. Specifically, the
authors compare different detectors fine-tuned for the binary
classification task of GAN-generated against natural image
detection. The same authors also show how a model-specific
fingerprint can be retrieved by GAN generated images in order
to identify the specific network used for image generation [5].
In [16], authors apply an incremental learning strategy to train
a GAN-generated image detector that can be progressively
updated in time as new images from different kinds of GANs
are processed. In [28], the authors propose a method to detect
GAN-generated images by analyzing the disparities in color
components between real scene images and generated images.
In [6], GAN images are detected by analyzing saturation arti-
facts in pixel distributions. Moreover, if videos are analyzed,
methods exploiting also the temporal evolution of frames have
been proposed [27], [29].
III. MOTIVATIONS
Natural images, as many other natural processes, can be
roughly approximated as autoregressive signals [30]. This is
the rationale behind different historical as well as more re-
cently proposed image compression [30], [31] and generation
[32], [33] methods. From these assumptions, an image can be
modeled as a complex autoregressive signal with a generally
low-pass characteristics.
GAN generator’s structures are usually composed by a
concatenation of limited-support convolutional layers followed
by non-linearities. Filters’ coefficients are optimized so that
GAN’s response to a given input belongs to the desired output
class. However, in most GAN implementations, practical and
complexity reasons have led to the adoption of filters with a
limited size. Therefore, if no recursive operations are applied
in the network architecture, the output of a GAN generator
looks more like a signal filtered through a Finite Impulse
Response (FIR) filter than a complex autoregressive process.
The rationale behind the proposed method is that the infor-
mation related to the filter ideally used to generate the data
under analysis can be used to discriminate natural images (with
autoregressive and complex spectra) from GAN-generated
ones (generated through operations closer to FIR filtering).
This can be done analyzing the statistics of quantized DCT
coefficients.
More precisely, let us assume that an input grayscale image
is partitioned into K distinct 8 × 8 blocks, which are then
mapped into the 2D-DCT domain and further quantized. This
processing chain is used by the JPEG coding standards and
proves to be tailored to the spectral characteristics of images.
Some of the past works highlight that, in the frequency
domain, the quantized DCT coefficient statistics of natural
images must follow Benford’s law [22].
Let us denote as cn,∆(k) the DCT coefficient at the n-
th frequency in zig-zag mode obtained from the k-th block
and quantized with step ∆. It is possible to compute the
corresponding FD with base b as
db,n,∆(k) =
⌊ |cn,∆(k)|
bblogb |cn,∆(k)|c
⌋
. (2)
As db,n,∆(k) can only assume b−1 values (i.e., all possible
digits defined in base b apart from zero), its pmf pˆb,n,∆
computed over the K blocks is composed by b− 1 elements.
For the sake of notational compactness, let us momentarily
drop the indexes n, b, and ∆. We can formally define the pmf
pˆ(d) as
pˆ(d) =
1
K
K∑
k=1
1x(d(k)), d ∈ {1, 2, . . . , b− 1}, (3)
where
1x(y) =
{
1 if y = x,
0 otherwise.
(4)
This pmf for a natural image must follow the generalized
Benford’s law equation
p(d) = β logb
(
1 +
1
γ + dδ
)
, (5)
where β is a scale factor, γ and δ parameterize the logarithmic
curve, and d ∈ {1, 2, ..., b − 1} is one possible value of the
considered first digits in base b.
The fitness between pˆ(d) and p(d) can be measured by some
divergence functions such as the Jensen-Shannon divergence
DJS (pˆ|p)
DJS (pˆ|p) = DKL (pˆ|p) +DKL (p|pˆ) , (6)
which is a symmetrized version of the well-known Kullback-
Leibler divergence
DKL (pˆ|p) =
b−1∑
d=1
pˆ(d) log
pˆ(d)
p(d)
. (7)
Since DJS proves to be unstable for biased pmfs, it is
possible to use the symmetrized Renyi divergence
DRα (pˆ|p) =
1
1− α (logSα (pˆ, p) + logSα (p, pˆ)) , (8)
or the symmetrized Tsallis divergence
DTα (pˆ|p) =
1
1− α (2− Sα (pˆ, p)− Sα (p, pˆ)) , (9)
where
Sα (q, p) =
b−1∑
d=1
q(d)α/p(d)α−1. (10)
It is possible to prove that, whenever an image is altered
(e.g., it is compressed/quantized a second time, etc.), Benford’s
law is not verified anymore. In fact, many modifications
redistribute image coefficients among the bins of the quantizer,
thus the final pmf associated to quantized DCT coefficients
presents some oscillating probability values that deviate from
the ideal distribution. For these reasons, many solutions in
the past measured the divergence between the empirically-
estimated pˆ(d) and its ideal fitted version p(d) in order to
find whether the image has been altered or not. In this paper
we show that it is possible to adopt the same solution to detect
GAN-generated pictures.
IV. GAN-GENERATED IMAGE DETECTION
In this section we provide a formal definition of the GAN-
generated image detection problem and report all the technical
details about the detection method we propose.
A. Problem formulation
We define the GAN-generated image detection problem as a
two-class classification problem. Given an image I , we want to
understand whether it has been synthetically generated through
a GAN, or it is a natural photograph.
Formally, to solve this problem we consider a pipeline
composed by two blocks: a feature extractor and a supervised
classifier. The feature extractor implements the function Φ(·),
which turns the image into a more compact yet informative
representation, i.e., the feature vector φ = Φ(I). The classifier
implements the function M(·) such that: M(φ) = 0 if the
image is a natural one; M(φ) = 1 if the image comes from
a GAN. With this framework in mind, we focus on designing
the function Φ(·) based on Benford’s law, so that a simple
classifier can be effectively used.
B. Detection method
The feature extraction process is depicted in Fig. 2. Given
an image I , we divide it in K non-overlapping blocks with
resolution 8 × 8 pixel. From each block, we compute its
2D-DCT representation. We then quantize it using a given
quantization step ∆ (chosen for each coefficient according to
a JPEG quantization matrix).
Given a base b, we compute the first digit of the n-th
quantized 2D-DCT frequency sample from the k-th block
according to (2). We then compute the pmf pˆb,n,∆ according
to (3). Examples of pˆ for different bases for both natural and
GAN-generated images are reported in Fig. 3. Finally, we fit
generalized Benford’s law expressed in (5) by solving a mean
square error minimization problem as
pfitb,n,∆ = arg min
p
b−1∑
d=1
(pˆb,n,∆(d)− p(d))2. (11)
DCT FD
DCT FD
DCT FD
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Fig. 2. Feature extraction pipeline considering a single divergence, quantiza-
tion step ∆, base b and DCT coefficient n. Extraction process is repeated for
multiple parameters.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
First Digit
0.1
0.2
0.3
p(
d
)
Natural
GAN
Benford
(a) b = 10
1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37
First Digit
0.0
0.1
0.2
p(
d
)
Natural
GAN
Benford
(b) b = 40
Fig. 3. Different pmf pˆ for natural (blue) and GAN-generated images
(oranges) are compared to the ideal Benford curve (dashed green) for different
bases b. Blue and orange curves deviates differently from the green one.
Comparing the computed pmf pˆb,n,∆ and the Benford fit
pfitb,n,∆, we compute Jensen-Shannon divergence D
JS
b,n,∆, Renyi
divergence DRb,n,∆, and Tsallis divergence D
T
b,n,∆ as reported
in Section III. Notice that we removed the dependency of
Tsallis and Renyi divergence on α as we keep it constant in
our experiments.
Finally, considering a set B of bases, a set N of DCT
frequencies and a set J of JPEG quality factors driving the
quantization parameter ∆, we obtain the final feature vector
by concatenating all divergences as:
φB,N ,J = [DJSb,n,∆, D
R
b,n,∆D
T
b,n,∆]b∈B,n∈N ,∆∈J . (12)
Notice the the feature vector size depends on how many DCT
coefficients, bases and quantization steps are used during the
analysis. For instance, if we choose a single compression
step, a single DCT frequency and a single base, the feature
vector will be composed by the concatenation of just three
divergences, thus having dimensionality 3. Conversely, if we
use multiple bases, frequencies and compression steps, we
end up with a bigger vector. In our experiments, we consider
vectors with dimensionality ranging from 3 to 540, as shall be
explained in Section V.
After feature computation, the vector φB,N ,J is fed to a
supervised classifier. In order to study the effectiveness of
Benford-based features, we do not adopt unnecessarily com-
plicated classifiers M(·). Specifically, we resort to a Random
Forest classifier.
V. RESULTS
In this section we discuss the used datasets, the experimental
setup, and finally report all the results achieved with the
Fig. 4. Examples of original (top) and GAN-generated (bottom) images
belonging to the dataset proposed in [16].
TABLE I
DATASET COMPOSITION
Architecture Dataset Number of images
orange2apple 1280
photo2ukiyoe 4072
winter2summer 1484
zebra2horse 1670
Cycle-Gan photo2cezanne 3978
photo2vangogh 4099
photo2monet 4765
facades 259
cityscapes 1996
sats 684
lsun bedroom 30770
lsun bridge 28768
ProGAN lsun churchoutdoor 29120
lsun kitchen 42706
lsun tower 29020
proposed technique for GAN-generated image detection.
A. Dataset
In order to build our dataset, we started from the publicly
available GAN-dataset released by Marra et al. [16]. Specifi-
cally, we considered a corpus composed by 15 different sub-
datasets of images obtained employing 2 different architec-
tures: Cycle-Gan [34] and ProGAN [35]. The first architecture
is designed for image-to-image translation purpose, i.e., map-
ping an image of a given class (i.e., pictures of horses) to an
image of another one (i.e., pictures of zebras). The second
architecture is a generator able of creating natural looking
pictures of different scenes depending on the used training data
(e.g., bedroom pictures, bridges, etc.). Each dataset comprises
both natural images and their GAN-generated counterparts. All
images are color images and have a resolution of 256× 256
pixel. The complete composition is reported in Table I and
some examples of the more than 200 000 images are reported
in Fig. 4.
B. Setup
As shown in Section IV, each feature depends on a selected
set of bases B, DCT frequencies N , and analysis JPEG
Quality Factor (QF) describing the set of quantization steps
J . With regards to bases, we test all combinations of sets
of bases B ⊆ {10, 20, 40, 60} containing from one to four
elements. This leads to 15 possible combinations of bases
(i.e., from B = {10} to B = {10, 20, 40, 60}). Concerning
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Fig. 5. Accuracy obtained with different feature vectors obtained changing the
considered sets B, N and J . Each vector has a different length and provides
a different accuracy result.
the selected DCT frequencies, we choose a limited amount of
sets N ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , 9} (i.e., including the first 9 frequencies
in zig-zag order after DC) , similarly to other detectors
available in literature [12]). Specifically, we only consider
9 sets obtained by progressively-adding one frequency at a
time from the previous set (i.e., N = {1}, N = {1, 2},
. . ., N = {1, 2, . . . , 9}). As for the quantization step val-
ues, the final feature set was created concatenating the 5
arrays of divergences obtained using JPEG QFs in the set
J ⊆ {80, 85, 90, 95, 100}. Considering all combinations of
bases, frequencies and JPEG quantization steps, we obtain a
total amount of 675 different setups.
For each feature vector described in Section IV (i.e.,
each setup), we trained a different Random Forest classifier
performing Leave-One-Group-Out cross-validation over the
various datasets as explained in [4]. The choice of Random
Forest was suggested by the low complexity requirements, the
generalization capabilities, and the resilience to small training
datasets. Namely, given a dataset Di out of the complete set
of dataset D, we trained our model over the remaining Dj ,
∀j 6= i and we test over Di. Results are always shown on the
leave-out dataset, and we report the maximum accuracy value
among all the different setups. To provide a practical example,
let us consider the situation in which we test on dataset
Di = orange2apple. This consists of original images (i.e.,
apples and oranges) and GAN images (apples turned into
oranges and viceversa). The classifier was trained on all the
other images (excluding those in orange2apple) in order
to avoid biasing the results with overfitting. We adopted the
Random Forest implementation provided with the open source
Scikit Learn Python library. After a grid search over several
candidates, we fixed the number of Decision Trees to 100,
with bootstrap sampling enabled. We selected Gini index as
splitting policy, leaving all the other parameters as their default
values.
C. Experiments
In this section we report all experimental results achieved to
evaluate the proposed technique. Moreover, we report a com-
parison against baseline solutions. Finally, we provide some
additional insights in terms of resilience to JPEG compression.
To select the baselines, we focused on the work proposed
by Marra et al. [4] since, to the best of our knowledge, it
is the only work to perform an extensive GAN detection
test over a large dataset of images. Specifically, we selected
two baselines: a completely data-driven one based on deep
learning; a solution based on hand-crafted features commonly
used in the forensics literature.
Similarly to the solution in [4], we compared our approach
with the Xception Convolutional Neural Network (CNN), as
the first baseline method. According to the results in [4],
this set of features seems to provide the best results over
most of the considered datasets. Starting from the pretrained
model, we finetuned it on our dataset, following the same
Leave-One-Group-Out strategy we adopted for the Random
Forest training. We used 70% of the training data for the
actual training, and the remaining 30% for validation, testing
on the Leave-Out dataset. We resorted to Adam optimization
algorithm, with an initial learning rate of 0.0001, training until
reaching convergence on a validation plateau. We adopted the
Keras implementation of Xception, performing the training in
several hours on a workstation equipped with a NVIDIA Titan
V GPU, a Intel Xeon E5-2687W and 256 GB of RAM.
The second baseline method operates a linear Support
Vector Machine (SVM) on a set of handcrafted steganalysis
rich-features (as suggested in [4]). These features have been
successfully used in image forgery detection tasks as well [36].
The model has been trained following the same train/test strat-
egy used for Xception, using the Scikit Learn implementation
of Support Vector Machine (SVM).
Feature length and parameters. In the design of the proposed
solution we considered different combinations of features
obtained varying the parameters in the set B, N , I and
changing feature vectors’ lengths. As a matter of fact, it is
necessary to evaluate how the vector length could impact
on the classifier performance. Fig. 5 shows the average test
accuracy obtained on all datasets considering all possible 675
feature vectors. It is possible to notice that even the smallest
feature vectors of just 3 elements enable achieving an accuracy
greater than 0.75. It is sufficient to use 50 features to have
accuracy higher than 0.97.
In order to gain a better insight on the effect of using
different bases, DCT coefficients and quantization steps, we
performed an analysis by keeping some parameters fixed, and
just changing the others. Fig. 6(a) and (b) show the results
with a single fixed quantization step value, and considering
all the values, respectively. In both scenarios it is possible to
notice that the greatest improvement is obtained when more
than a single DCT coefficient is used. Moreover, the more
the coefficients, the better the results. Fig. 6(c) and (d) report
the results with features from a single fixed FD base and from
all the considered bases, respectively. It seems that using more
than one base only marginally improve the results. As a matter
of fact, both figures are very similar. Finally, Fig. 6(e) and (f)
display the accuracy values obtained from the features of a
single DCT frequency and of the whole set of frequencies,
respectively. . From these figures it is possible to note that
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Fig. 6. Accuracy varying different parameters: (a) fix 1 JPEG compressions;
(b) fix 5 JPEG compressions; (c) fix 1 base; (d) fix 4 bases; (e) fix 1 DCT
coefficient; (f) fix 9 DCT coefficients. When we fix a single parameter, we
average all results obtained by fixing that parameter to each possible value it
can span.
the more the considered quantization steps, the higher the
accuracy for any other parameters set. This is not particularly
surprising, as Benford’s law is naturally linked to the used
JPEG quantization.
Comparison against baseline. In order to compare against
the selected baselines solution, we finetuned Xception network
and trained a linear SVM on the steganalysis features for
each dataset according to the same procedure used for our
Random Forest as suggested in [4]. Table II reports the
breakdown of test accuracy scores for all datasets. The highest
average accuracy among the considered methods is obtained
by the proposed method, and it is higher than 0.99. It is also
interesting to notice that the proposed solution is considerably
better than the baseline CNN on winter2summer, sats
and lsun_bedroom, which seem to be particularly though
for the latter. These results highlight that, in order to properly
train a very deep network like Xception, a much larger dataset
probably is needed. However, this might be difficult to obtain
in a reduced amount of time in a forensic scenario. On the
contrary, the proposed feature vector is very compact, thus
Random Forest does not suffer from a smaller training set.
TABLE II
ACCURACY RESULTS COMPARED TO THE BASELINE SOLUTIONS FOR EACH
DATASET. AVERAGE ACCURACY (AVG) IS ALSO REPORTED. BEST RESULT
PER DATASET IN BOLD.
Dataset Proposed Xception Steganalysis
orange2apple 98.13 97.64 88.80
photo2ukiyoe 100.00 97.41 86.78
winter2summer 100.00 68.33 77.96
zebra2horse 99.69 89.58 91.01
photo2cezanne 99.97 95.91 95.88
photo2vangogh 100.00 93.75 94.68
photo2monet 99.84 94.08 94.80
facades 100.00 99.84 73.93
cityscapes 100.00 100.00 100.00
sats 99.69 73.00 90.92
lsun bedroom 100.00 76.22 98.92
lsun bridge 99.89 82.49 95.90
lsun churchoutdoor 99.99 99.79 98.81
lsun kitchen 99.99 87.26 99.49
lsun tower 99.98 95.45 98.87
avg 99.83 89.64 91.03
The baseline handcrafted method performs reasonably well,
but the obtained accuracy is lower than that of the proposed
method of almost 9% on average.
Resilience to JPEG compression. When images are shared
online, JPEG compression is almost always applied in order
to reduce network and storage requirements. Therefore, we
measured the performance of the proposed method whenever
a further JPEG compression is applied with different coding
parameter configurations.
In a first scenario, GAN-generated and real images have
been randomly JPEG compressed considering quality factors
distributed in {85, . . . , 100}. The originally-trained detector
(on non-compressed images) was then tested on this newly
compressed dataset In this situation, the proposed solution
approaches a random guess accuracy. However, this situation is
not completely unexpected. As a matter of fact, Benford’s law
is strictly tailored to JPEG compression. Therefore, scrambling
with JPEG coefficients statistics through recompression has a
high impact on Benford’s features.
We therefore considered a second scenario, which is more
realistic as shown in [4]. If we know that images might
be JPEG recompressed, we can also train our system on
JPEG compressed images. We therefore re-trained our method
and the baseline on compressed images, and tested them
on compressed images. In this situation, results improve as
expected. As a matter of fact, the proposed solution accuracy
decreases, but still remains higher than 0.80. In particular,
results depend on the specific datasets and GAN architecture.
Indeed, all results related to ProGAN (i.e., last five datasets)
show an almost optimal accuracy always higher than 0.99.
Conversely, on Cycle-Gan images, only a couple of datasets
exhibit accuracy grater than 0.70. In this situation, if compu-
tational is feasible for the adopted architecture, the baseline
network might be preferable.
We then tested a third scenario, assuming that the analyst
knows which is the quality factor adopted by the final JPEG
TABLE III
ACCURACY OBTAINED USING DIFFERENT JPEG QUALITY FACTORS.
QF Dataset Proposed Xception
100
orange2apple 94.50 92.56
photo2ukiyoe 100.00 98.50
cityscapes 100.00 100.00
lsun tower 100.00 94.64
95
orange2apple 82.01 90.66
photo2ukiyoe 97.00 98.42
cityscapes 99.99 99.32
lsun tower 99.80 99.48
90
orange2apple 65.93 85.61
photo2ukiyoe 92.01 98.17
cityscapes 100.00 99.66
lsun tower 99.60 98.86
compression stage (since it can be read from the bit stream).
It is possible to train a different Random Forest classifier
or Xception network for each quality factor. We therefore
generated three versions of the dataset by recompressing it
with quality factor 100, 95, and 90, respectively. For each
quality factor, we trained the proposed method and Xception
baseline using the aforementioned leave-one-group-out strat-
egy. We did not consider steganalysis features anymore, as in
[4] the authors already showed that they greatly suffer JPEG
compression. Results are reported in Table III. It is possible
to notice that for high quality factors, the proposed Benford-
based method outperforms the baseline. Xception network
shows better results starting from quality factor 90.
In the final testing scenario, we assume that the analyst
wants to train a different classifier for each JPEG quality
factor, and for each kind of image content. As an example, if
the analyst is interested in detecting fake oranges with a given
quality factors, he/she might train only on the orange2apple
dataset, rather than the others. In this situation (i.e., known
quality factor and kind of GAN training dataset), both the
proposed method and the Xception baseline achieve an almost
perfect result for each quality factor (i.e., 100, 95 and 90).
D. Analysis on faces.
All results shown so far are obtained not considering GANs
generating face images. This is due to two main reasons.
First, GANs that were trained to generate face images produce
particularly realistic results lately. This make face images
harder to detect as GAN-generated compared to other kind
of imagery. Indeed, shadows and lightning very often respect
physics law, thus making Benford’s law almost verified [14].
Second, face-generating GANs are often trained on common
pristine face datasets [37], which makes the Leave-One-Group-
Out testing strategy applied to now impracticable.
In the light of these considerations, we decided to create
a specific dataset, composed by all the faces dataset in the
original corpus, generated by ProGAN [35] (19 870 images),
StarGAN [38] (50 000 images) and GlowGAN [39] (49 900
images), plus some additional images generated by the more
recently proposed StyleGAN2 [40] (2000 images). As pris-
Fig. 7. Examples of faces generated with StyleGan2 [40].
TABLE IV
ACCURACY RESULTS FOR EACH FACE TEST DATASET. AVERAGE
ACCURACY (AVG) IS ALSO REPORTED. ACCURACY HIGHER THAN 85%
ARE REPORTED IN BOLD.
Dataset Proposed
progan celeba 79.75
stargan black hair 97.26
stargan blond hair 96.56
stargan brown hair 96.76
stargan male 96.24
stargan smiling 96.06
glow black hair 86.56
glow blond hair 88.26
glow brown hair 86.18
glow male 87.11
glow smiling 83.04
stylegan2-0.5 77.18
stylegan2-1 72.63
avg 87.96
tine faces, we always consider images from the Celeb-A
dataset [37].
ProGAN is trained to generate realistic faces similar to
those from Celeb-A dataset [37]. StarGAN and GlowGAN
are trained to obtain faces with different characteristics (e.g.,
hair colors, smiles, etc.). Finally, StyleGAN2 produces images
at different qualities depending on its configuration parameter
ψ = 0.5 or ψ = 1 as suggested by the authors [40], starting
from the Flickr-Faces-HQ Dataset [35]. Some random images
from those generated by StyleGAN2 are shown in Fig. 7. For
each dataset, we train a Random Forest classifier considering
70% of the images as training set and 30% as test.
Table IV shows the achieved results on each test set. It is
possible to notice that StarGAN and GlowGAN seems to be
easier to detect. On the contrary, ProGAN and StyleGAN2
looks more challenging. These promising preliminary results
motivate some future work with more extended face image
datasets, also comparing against other baselines and in pres-
ence of editing operations.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we proposed a study on the use of the well-
known Benford’s law for the task of GAN-generated image
detection. We proposed a strategy to extract Benford-related
features from an image relying on different divergence defini-
tions. We also showed how to combine these features in order
to better exploit different bases as well as DCT frequencies.
Using these features, we performed a series of experiment
based on a simple Random Forest classifier in order to study
the amount of information captured by the features, rather than
focusing on specializing a complex classifier.
Results show that GAN-generated images often fail in re-
specting Benford’s law, thus can be discriminated from natural
pictures. However, some kind of CNN architectures seem to
produce images that are harder to detect than others. This
motivates future studies on this topic. Moreover, this suggests
to possibly embed Benford’s law into GAN loss function in
order to obtain even more realistic images.
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